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Quasi-Public Goods in
a Tiebout Model
by
Jan K. Brueckner*
A close reading of Tiebout ' s famous 1956 article [2] shows that the
public goods he had in mind were publicly-produced private goods rather
than pure public goods in the Samuelson sense. For example, he states that
"a doubling of the population means doubling the amount of services re-
quired." His claim that his argument addresses the problem that Samuelson
identified was not therefore completely valid. It remains true, however,
that publicly-produced private goods will not be optimally provided in
a jurisdiction where people have different tastes for the public good and
the same budget-balancing head tax is levied on all citizens. The level
of the good provided is the median optimal level among voters in the juris-
diction, a level which will be non-optimal for voters with "non-median" tastes
for the good.
Tiebout claimed that migration of voters to jurisdictions providing
an ideal level of the public good from their point of view would occur,
and that the surviving jurisdictions would provide the various public good
levels at minimum unit cost. The purpose of this paper is to show formally
that some of Tiebout' s conclusions were correct but that broadening the
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are my own.
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admissable class of public goods to include other quasi-public goods,
public goods subject to congestion, leads to different results on the
efficiency of production in ideal jurisdictions. It is no longer true
that the public good is produced at minimum average cost. The paper
also shows that, except in certain special cases, the migration equilibria
in the model are extremely difficult to analyse and that the possibility
of the formation of homogeneous cities that are ideal from the point
of view of their residents is really an open question. The paper also
investigates Pareto-ef f icient provision of the public good.
I.
Suppose the utility functions depend on g, a numeraire private
good acquired in a market and z, the consumption level of a public good
provided by the government. Let the income of all consumers be y. Since
the public good in Tiebout's model is actually a publicly-produced private
good, z = X/n, where X is the production level of the good and n is the
population of the jurisdiction. The good is distributed equally among
all consumers in the jurisdiction. The government faces a cost function
for production of the good, C(X), which does not depend on the location
or population of the. jurisdiction and which generates a U-shaped average
cost function. A jurisdiction which provides per capita consumption z to
its residents must produce nz of the public good. The budget-balancing
head tax for each consumer is C(nz)/n. The consumer's problem is to
choose simultaneously levels of g, z, and n which maximize utility subject
to the budget constraint. We view the consumer as choosing an ideal
g, z, n combination; whether such a combination is actually available to
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him is a separate issue. The Lagrangean is
U(g, z) - XCg +
^f-1 - y), (1)
where U is some utility function and A is a Lagrange multiplier. First
order conditions are
V
x
(g,z) = a (2)
U
2
(g,z) = XC'(nz) (3)
C r (nz) = C(nz)/nz (4)
g + C(nz)/n = y. (5)
Equation (4) immediately yields nz = X, where X is the average-cost-minimizing
level of X output. Substituting n = X/z into (2), (3), and (5) we get
the system
U
1
Cg,z) = a
U
2
(g,z) = XC'(X) (6)
g + C(X)z/X = y,
which solves for g, z, and A. Knowing z*, the consumer's optimal z,
n* can be solved for directly. The solution can be thought of as follows:
consumers solve for their optimal z level and then choose the city size
such that total output is provided at minimum average cost. When everyone
has the same utility function, only one city size is ideal. With a
variety of utility functions there will be a variety of city sizes that
are ideal from the point of view of consumers. Each city has the property
that n*z* = X. Large ideal cities have low per capita consumption levels
and small cities have large consumption levels. People always have an
incentive to find a city where tastes match their own and production occurs
efficiently. Whether such cities exist is another question entirely, as the
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following problem illustrates: what if the number of people fi who
find it best to live in a city with population n* does not in fact equal
n*? If n* > fi, not enough consumers are available to populate an ideal
city. If n* < n, the number of people desiring to live in the city exceeds
the ideal size. This problem will be discussed at greater length in the
third section.
When X production occurs with constant returns to scale, C(nz)/n = C(z)
and city size drops out of the problem. People segregate themselves
according to taste, but people of given taste may live in a city of any
size. Constant returns to scale clearly eliminates the problem raised in
the previous paragraph. When X production occurs with increasing returns
to scale, equation (4) does not have a solution; people want to live in
infinitely large cities.
A diagrammatic solution for the U-shaped average cost function case
is shown In Figure 1. The diagram shows a family of U-shaped curves as
functions of z. These curves are graphs of C(nz)/nz, which is the unit
price of z to the consumer as well as the average cost of producing X,
for different values of n. Curves corresponding to larger cities lie
farther to the left, and z* is the z level for which the demand curve
cuts an average cost curve at its minimum. The optimal n is the level
of n for that average cost curve. A consumer who values z more highly
has a higher demand curve and wishes to consume more z in a smaller city.
II.
Suppose ve have a quasi-public good, a more general class in which
the publicly-produced private good Is a special case. A general

characterization of such a good is the relationship
z = f(X,n). (7)
A pure public good has the property that z = X, which means 3z/3n = 0. The
salient feature of a quasi-public good is that 3z/3n = f < 0. More people
consuming the output X leads to a reduction in per capita consumption.
Also, we require 3z/3X = f > 0. Although no further structure on f is
needed for the analysis, it is interesting to examine polar cases. In
the private good case, z = X/n, 3z/3n = -z/n, and 3z/3X = 1/n, while in
the pure public good case z = X, 3z/3n = 0, and 3z/3X = 1. The quasi-
public good must satisfy f. > and f„ < 0, but a more stringent definition
might require — < f, < 1 and — < f < as well. The interpretation of
n — 1 n — I
these requirements is as follows: A small increase in X should increase
z by an amount which is less than the X increase but not less than the
X increase divided by the population. The bounds are given by the polar
cases of pure public and publicly-produced private goods. Similarly,
a small increase in n should have some depressing effect on z but the
effect should not cause z to fall by more than (z/n)dn, which equals the
removal of z from current citizens required to redistribute a fixed
amount of a private good over a population larger by dn . These bounds
on the first-order partial derivatives are speculative, but they further
restrict the class of functions f which might represent the "technology"
underlying quasi-public good production. One further restriction which
is not needed below but seems natural is f (x,n) < X, which says that
per capita consumption may not exceed production.
By the implicit function theorem, there exists a funtion h such that
X = h(z,n), (8)
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with h
n
£ 1/f > and h, = -£,/*, > 0. In this framework, the
consumer's
problem is characterized by the Lagrangean
i. te , .) - Kg
c(h
<';
*»
- y) < 9 >
with first-order conditions
(10)
(ID
U = A
u
2
= Acaoiyn
C'(h) = C'(h)/h2n
(12)
g + C(h)/n *> y (13 )
This system leads to optimal g, z, and n, just as in the private good
case. We may ask whether the solution leads to provision of the public
good at minimum average cost. From (11), output occurs above X, the
average cost minimum, when h„n < h at the optimum and below X when h n > h
at the optimum. If h n = h at the optimum, then X = X. To ascertain
which case is likely to hold, we must impose further restrictions on the
function h. Consider the quantity h(z
s
0). This is the output level
for X which provides per capita consumption z to a city of zero population.
Since this is not a meaningful quantity, h is not defined for n = 0.
A sensible restriction, though, is lim h(z,n) = for all z >_ 0, which
n-s-Q
says that as the city size approaches zero, the output level that generates
a per capita consumption equal to z approaches zero as well. In terms of
f, this means that f(0, 0) is not defined, and that if we consider an
"f isoquant," where f (X,n) =* 7, the limiting value of X on this curve as
n * is also zero, which holds for all z ^ 0. When this restriction is
made, the question h (z*, n*)n* — h(z*, n*) is reduced to a question
about the sign of h,,. If h
22
> 0, then h
2
*n* > h*, while if h
22
< 0, then

h *n* < h", and if h = 0, then h2*n*
= h*, where h^ and h* are h
2
and
h evaluated at the optimum.
2 2
Now h is 3 X/3n , which we may attempt to sign by an appeal to
intuition. The essence of quasi-public goods is the congestion phenomenon:
excessive numbers of people laying claim to a fixed output. To keep per
capita consumption at a fixed level when claimants to the public output
increase, we must increase total output: 3X/3n = h? > 0. The question
is whether output must rise at a faster cr slower rate than population to
keep z constant. If for any given X and n, proportional increases in both
lead to a reduction in z, then clearly h„„ > 0: X must increase faster than
n to keep z constant. If proportional increases in X and n lead to an
increase in z, then h _ < 0: X need not be increased as rapidly as n to
maintain z. "Congestion" increased (z fell) in the first case when X and
n were increased proportionally, while it decreased (z rose) in the second
case. Accordingly, let us refer to the h > case as the "increasing
congestion (for proportional increases in X and n)" case and label the
h„ 7 < and h = cases the "decreasing" and "constant congestion" cases
respectively. Since, for fixed z, the graph of h is just an f isoquant,
the increasing congestion case corresponds to f being strictly quasi-
concave, the decreasing congestion case corresponds to an f which is not
even weakly quasi-concave, while the constant congestion case means that
f is weakly, but not strictly, qua si- concave. Note that in the private good
X
case, f is — , which is weakly, but not strictly, quasi-concave. Equival-
ently, since h is nz in this case, h„„ = 0. The private good is a particular
example of the constant congestion case.
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Now h„
7
equals
-fr3(fU f 2
2
- 2f
12
f
l
f
2
+f
22
f
l
2
^ (14)
which is just the "marginal rate of transformation" along an f isoquant.
The assumption £.,_ < 0, diminishing returns to X for fixed n, seems
reasonable. The further assumptions f < and f < 9, which are also
apparently reasonable requirements, yield h„ 9 > 0. But f „ < 0, which
means that for fixed X, z decreases at a increasing rate as n increases,
-3
does not hold in the private good case, where f r>? - 2Xn > 0. This
suggests that there are other sensible f functions which violate the above
requirements, so we refrain from imposing them. Although we cannot
sign h„„, we have proved the following:
Theorem 1: if the publicly-produced good is a quasi-public good in that
z = f(X,n), where f > and f < 0, if equal city-budget-
balancing head taxes are levied on each consumer, and if the
total cost function for X generates a U-shaped_average cost
curve, then the following is true when liijuh(z, n) =
for all z >_ 0:
Regardless of the nature of his utility function, ^the con^
sumer's ideal city has an X output such that X — X as h^ — 0;
X is less than, equal to, or greater than the AC minimizxng
output when the increasing, constant, or decreasing congestion
cases, respectively, obtain.
See Figure 2 for a diagrammatic illustration ot the theorem.
The following problem may arise, as happened above: a certain number
of consumers ft may have utility functions which dictate that their ideal
community size is n?{ ^ n. This problem is discussed further in the next
section. We saw that constant returns to scale eliminated this difficulty in
the private good case. However, from (12) it is evident that no solution
to the consumer problem exists with constant returns to scale and increasing
or decreasing congestion: h ^ h n for all z and n means AC 4- MC at the
optimum, which is impossible with constant returns to scale, where MC H AC.
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In the constant returns to scale with constant congestion case, city size
drops out of the problem. Since h (z, n)n = h(z, n), integration yields
h(z, n) = A(z)n, and C(h)/n becomes C(A(z)). The private good case was
a particular example of this. A solution with increasing returns to scale
appears to be possible in the increasing congestion case, where h n > h.
Then (12) says MC < AC, which is consistent with increasing returns.
An interesting final point concerns pure public goods. The head tax
in a community providing a level X of the pure public good is C(X)/n.
Solving for the optimal n in this framework is impossible since the head
tax decreases monotonically as n increases without bound. People desire
to live in arbitrarily large communities in order to spread the cost of
the public good, which is not subject to congestion, over as large a
population as possible.
III.
It has been established that ideal communities need not produce at
minimum average cost when the publicly-produced good is a general quasi-
public good. Now we may ask whether ideal communities are indeed formed
in a world with zero migration costs. In the constant returns to scale,
constant congestion case, ideal homogeneous communities will be formed in
any array of sizes. But in general, formation of ideal communities is
less certain. If there are m types of individuals, with k.n. consumers
of the ith type, where k is a non-negative integer, and if by accident
i
the optimal city size for the ith type, n.* 3 happens to equal n^. , i = 1, . . . , m,
then k. ideal homogeneous communities of type i individuals will be
formed, i = 1, 2, . .
.
, m. However, there is no reason to expect such a
fortuitous situation. Suppose there are two types of individuals, with
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ideal city sizes n * and n *, and populations n and n_ such that
2n* > n > n *, and n < n *. Can an ideal city be formed in this
1 J. X /. t.
situation? Suppose that n„ > n, - n *, and suppose we require one ideal
Z 1 i
type 1 city (A) and another mixed city (B) , whose median voter will be a
type 2 consumer. For this situation to be locally stable it must be
true that a type 1 consumer moving to A reduces his utility after a
new z level, based on the now larger population, has been chosen in A.
The same must be true for a type 2 moving from B. But satisfaction of
these requirements does not imply that other locally stable equilibria
do not exist. It appears that ideal homogeneous cities would emerge
only by accident. The extreme complexity of situations where the number
of consumers of different types is not "right" should be obvious.
We might imagine, though, that if the number of type i consumers were
extremely large compared to n.* for all i, an equilibrium might approximate
the one with the "perfect fit" that was described above. Numerous near-
ideal cities might be observed; we might imagine extra type i consumers
distributed over a large number of type i cities, making each one slightly
too big. Whether or not these cities would produce the good at minimum
average cost is uncertain because of their non-ideal size.
IV.
In the preceeding analysis, supply considerations have not played a
role in that no restrictions were placed on aggregate consumption in the
city. For instance, the city did not need to trade off X if its residents
wished to consume more g. Suppose, however, that cities are closed to
trade with only local resources such as labor available for g and X
production. Then a city of size n will have a transformation curve
defined by F(X., G, n) = 0, where G is total output of g and the n argument
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cautures the influence of labor force size on the position of the trans-
formation curve.
Suppose the government wishes to maximize a social welfare function
linear in the utilities of the city residents, who need not be identical.
The Lagrangean for such a problem is
SA
1
D
i
(gi ,
z) - u(z - f(x, n)) - T(£g.. - C) - YF(X, G, n) , (15)
where X. are the welfare weights and u, t, and y are Lagrange multipliers.
The first order conditions yield
I U//U/ - F^ (16)
which says that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between g
and z must equal the marginal rate of transformation between G and z. This,
of course, is also the condition for Pareto efficiency. For illustrative
purposes, we may set A . - 1 for all i and assume that utility functions
are all identical. Then (16) is
VU1 = V f iF 2n ' (17)
If the government sets the price of z at t--'(n), which equals F.. /f F n
evaluated at the optimum, and if it adjusts per capita income so that each
consumer's income equals y*(n) = g*(n) + t*(n)z*(n), where g*(n) and
z*(n) are the socially optimal g and z, individual utility maximization
will generate the socially optimal outcome when both g and z are normal
goods. This is true because normality implies that the implicit relation-
ship g = B(z) which results from D /U = t*(n) has the property that
B' > 0. This fact, in conjunction with the downward-sloping budget con-
straint, g + t*(n)z = y* (n) , guarantees a unique solution at z*(n), g* (n)
.
Each consumer votes for the public good level z*(n), which is then pro-
vided by the government.
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If all consumers are identical and all cities are run efficiently,
the consumer's choice-of-city problem reduces to a choice of city size:
the consumer maximizes U(g*(n), z*(n)) with respect to n. If the number of
consumers is large compared to the ideal city population, an equilibrium
might result with many efficiently-run cities, each with approximately the
ideal population.
The tax revenue in a city of sizo n is
nz*(n)c*(n) = fF
]
/f
1
F
2
(18)
where the. right hand side is evaluated at the optimum. We may ask whether
3
tax revenues pay for provision of the public good, As long as production
of X and g is cost minimizing, F /F will equal the ratio of the marginal
costs of production for X and g, MC /MC . Perfect competition among g
producers means marginal cost equals average cost which equals the price
of g, which is unity. So the absolute value of the slope of the trans-
formation curve equals MC . Suppose X is produced by the government at
constant returns to scale or that it is purchased by the government from
perfectly competitive producers. Then MC - AC and from (18) tax revenue
is (f/Xf ) • (XAC ) , which exceeds the total cost of the public good when
j. X
f > Xf and falls short of total cost when f < Xf . Since f (0, n) =
is a natural requirement, these inequalities are equivalent to f < 0,
f > 0. We have
Theorem 2: In an efficiently run city with identical consumers where the
government maximizes a linear social welfare function with
equal welfare weights, production of g is perfectly competitive,
and X is produced either by perfectly competitive producers
or by the government with constant returns to scale, then
tax revenues are greater than (less than) the cost of pro-
viding the public good when there are decreasing (increasing)
returns to scale for X in generation of z, per capita consumption
of the public good.

If the government produces the good with a non-constant returns to scale
production function, MC is not qual to ACX , and the
Theorem
does not hold.
In the analysis of sections I and II, the government was viewed as
producing the public good itself. If the government purchases X from a
perfectly competitive industry, then C(X)/X, the average cost curve,
must be interpreted as a long run industry supply curve.
V.
This paper has shown that Tiebout's conjecture that ideal cities
produce the good at minimum average cost was correct when the publicly-
produced good is a private good, but it has been demonstrated that enlarging
the class of admissible goods to include all congestible public, goods
yields ideal cities that do not necessarily produce at the average cost
minimum. In addition, the explicit formulation of the consumer choice
problem has suggested that migration equilibria may not result in the
formation of ideal cities, as Tiebout believed. In analyzing Pareto-
efficient provision of the quasi-public good, it has been shown that total
tax revenue generally will not equal the cost of providing the public
good when consumers are identical. The characterization of quasi-public
goods employed in the analysis has generated a number of interesting
results; fruitful use of this concept, in other areas of public finance
also may be possible.
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FOOTNOTES
While an example of a publicly-produced private good might be water
supplied to a municipality by the government, an example of a quasi-
public good that is not private would be police or fire services. Output
could be police or fire units on duty and per capita "consumption"
could be average response time. For fixed output, response time falls
as n increases. Some other common public goods are less well characterized
by (8). We might imagine that per capita ''consumption" of parks would
depend not only on acres of parks provided and population but also on
the tastes of the population for parks. Parks in a city of park lovers
would be more congested than in another city with the same park acreage
and population but fewer park enthusiasts. For a park-like public good,
it seems that the tastes as well as the size of the population must
enter a relationship such as (8).
2
See Oakland [1] for a different treatment of congestible public goods.
Some steps in the following analysis draw on Oakland [1]
.
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